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Abstract
Despite the burgeoning literature on right-wing populism, there is still considerable
uncertainty about its causes, its impact on liberal democracies and about promising
counter-strategies. Inspired by recent suggestions that (1) the emancipatory left has
made a significant contribution to the proliferation of the populist right; and (2) populist
movements, rather than challenging the established socio-political order, in fact stabilize
and further entrench its logic, this article argues that an adequate understanding of the
populist phenomenon necessitates a radical shift of perspective: beyond the democratic
and emancipatory norms, which still govern most of the relevant literature. Approaching
its subject matter via democratic theory and modernization theory, it undertakes a
reassessment of the triangular relationship between modernity, democracy and popu-
lism. It finds that the latter is not helpfully conceptualized as anti-modernist or anti-
democratic but should, instead, be regarded as a predictable feature of the form of
politics distinctive of today’s third modernity.
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Towards a shift of perspective
The ongoing tide of right-wing populism rapidly and profoundly is remoulding the
political culture of Western liberal democracies. Yet, despite the burgeoning literature
on the subject, there is still considerable uncertainty as to the triggers of populist move-
ments, the drivers powering their proliferation, the prospects of their further develop-
ment, the transformative impact they are having on established democratic orders, and
effective political responses. Two irritating suggestions which have recently gained
considerable attention are, first, that the emancipatory democratic left, despite being the
most vociferous opponent of the populist right, has made a significant contribution to its
proliferation: by neglecting the concerns of the working class and focusing, instead, on
the libertarian post-materialist interests of the privileged middle class (e.g. Michea,
2009; Eribon, 2013; Inglehart and Norris, 2016). Second, it has been proposed that
populist movements may have to be understood not so much ‘as subversive of the
existing state of things and as the starting point for a more or less radical reconstruction
of a new order’ (Laclau, 2005: 177), but rather as ‘post-utopian’ (Krastev, 2017: 35) and
‘perfectly suited to societies where citizens are consumers above all else’ (Krastev, 2017:
35). They may have to be seen as a kind of anti-political performance or theatre that
while appearing to challenge the prevailing order, ultimately actually stabilizes it
(Rosanvallon, 2008; Milanovic, 2016; Appadurai, 2017). Both these suggestions seem
very intriguing but, as yet, neither of them has been fully developed for the theorization
of the populist phenomenon, although they do raise a number of questions calling for
more detailed exploration: Exactly what is the contribution of the emancipatory move-
ments? How legitimate is the critique that the left has let its voters down? How convin-
cing are suggestions that in order to stop the right-wing tide, the progressive left ought to
reconnect with those social groups which it had originally represented (Mouffe, 2016;
Fraser, 2017)? And as regards the second point: what exactly is being performed in these
anti-political movements? Why do they keep growing, if they do not really specify any
perspective of change for those to whom they appeal? How are we to make sense of the
counter-intuitive assertion that they challenge but at the same time reconfirm the estab-
lished socio-economic order?
In trying to address these questions, this article focuses specifically on contemporary
right-wing populist movements in Europe and liberal democracies whose political cul-
ture has European origins. It does not deal with historically earlier varieties of populism
such as the US farmers’ movements of the latter part of the nineteenth century (e.g.
Goodwyn, 1976; Hofstadter, 1955), nor with contemporary left-wing populisms as, for
example, in Latin America (e.g. De la Torre, 2015). Leaving the complex debate about
the definition and ‘many faces’ (Woods and Weijnert, 2014) of populism to one side (e.g.
Canovan, 1999; Arditi, 2004; Laclau, 2005; Mudde, 2007, 2010, 2013; Kriesi, 2014;
Kriesi and Pappas, 2015; Mu¨ller 2016), it understands right-wing populism as the polit-
ical beliefs and logic of movements, parties and individuals, which invoke the idea of a
homogeneous people with a unified collective will and claim this people as the sole
source of political legitimacy; whose discourse is shaped by a logic of othering, exclu-
sion and portraying the good people as victims of corrupt elites, sinister conspiracies and
parasitic social free-riders; and which swiftly translate all substantive issues into moral
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debates displaying anti-pluralist, illiberal and xenophobic value orientations. Working
from this generalist understanding, the article rethinks the current proliferation of
right-wing populism: (1) from the perspective of recent democratic theory, notably the
diagnosis of a post-democratic turn (Blu¨hdorn, 2013a, 2013b) moving contemporary
societies into a post-democratic constellation (Blu¨hdorn, 2014, 2017) that is not well
described by polemic notions of post-democracy as popularized by Colin Crouch (2004);
and (2) from an explicitly modernization-theoretical perspective that interprets contem-
porary right-wing populism as indicative of a new phase of modernity beyond Ulrich
Beck’s second or reflexive modernity (Beck et al., 1994; Beck, 1997).
As regards democratic theory, it is striking that populism has so far mostly been
analysed from the normative perspective of liberal, representative democracy (Canovan,
1999; Arditi, 2004). It has been conceptualized either as a pathology of and threat to
democracy (Mudde, 2010; Mu¨ller, 2016), or as a redemptive phenomenon placing new
emphasis on the true core of democracy and thus as a potential corrective for the
perceived deformations of contemporary representative democracies (Laclau, 2005;
Abts and Rummens, 2007; Arditi, 2010; Kaltwasser, 2012). Yet, in either case, the
possibility is systematically eclipsed that in contemporary western(ized) societies
the emancipatory progressive ideal of democracy, as the new social movements since
the 1970s had once again articulated it, may actually have become – at least partially –
outdated, dysfunctional and undesirable (Zolo, 1992; Rancie`re, 2007; Dean, 2009; Blu¨h-
dorn, 2013b, 2014). But if, and to the extent that this actually is the case, the populist
phenomenon should no longer be investigated as a threat to, or crisis of, liberal repre-
sentative democracy but, if anything, from the perspective of its radical transformation
into something new.
In respect of modernization theory, populist movements are commonly conceptua-
lized as an explicitly anti-modernist phenomenon, specific to the contemporary era of
‘regressive modernity’ (Inglehart and Norris, 2017; see also Geiselberger, 2017) and
typically mobilizing the losers of modernization (Oliver and Rahn, 2016; Spruyt et al.,
2016). From this perspective, the proliferation of populism then appears either as a
response to rising levels of economic inequality as described by Piketty (2014) and
Milanovic (2016), or as a ‘cultural backlash’ by social strata that have not moved along
with the modernization-induced shift towards cosmopolitan liberal value orientations
(Inglehart and Norris, 2016). Yet, neither of these approaches accounts for the fact that
populist movements and parties often explicitly present themselves as modern, forward-
looking and progressive, and have an appeal well beyond the often-cited losers of
modernization (e.g. Ivarsflaten, 2007; Lengfeld, 2017). Also, in focusing either on the
material or the cultural dimension of the populist phenomenon, both of them fail to grasp
the intricate relationship between the two dimensions which are, in fact, inseparably
connected to each other and both equally relevant.
Hence, in following up the above two ideas, this article at the same time addresses
deficits in much of the literature in terms of both democratic and sociological theory and
undertakes a thorough reassessment of the relationship between modernity, democracy
and populism. The second and third sections fully develop our argument that the threat-
or-corrective dichotomy is distinctly unhelpful, and specify a categorically new perspec-
tive from which, we believe, the populist phenomenon ought to be investigated. Section
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four outlines the challenges of the late-modern politics of identity, begins to specify,
from this new perspective, the political role of populist movements in contemporary
neoliberal societies and explains why their conceptualization as regressive or reactionary
is misconceived. The concluding section then synthesizes our theoretical considerations
in line with the model of a new third modernity (Blu¨hdorn, 2013a, 2017). It elaborates
how – as a discursive arena for the performance of sovereignty – populist movements
are a constitutive feature of the particular brand of politics that is characteristic of this
new era.
Peak democracy and the democratic parabola
The decline in public support for democratic institutions and in confidence in democratic
procedures is, we are suggesting, the first constitutive element of the new perspective
from which we have to rethink populism. This decline has been widely debated as a crisis
of democracy, conceptualized, inter alia, in terms of a crisis of political parties and
representation (e.g. Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000; Mair, 2013), the decline of political
ideologies and the bipolar order of left and right (e.g. Bell, 1976; Fukuyama, 2006), the
evaporation of societal coherence and social capital under conditions of differentiation
and complexity (Zolo, 1992; Putnam, 2000), and a marker of the neoliberal era of post-
democracy and post-politics (Crouch, 2004; Dean, 2009). The diagnosis of a post-
democratic constellation (Blu¨hdorn, 2014, 2017) takes up elements of all of these, but
distinguishes itself from the latter, in particular, in suggesting that democracy is not
simply threatened by neoliberal elites who have suspended democratic processes, with-
held democratic rights, and obstructed the fulfilment of democratic promises but that, in
the wake of a post-democratic turn (Blu¨hdorn, 2013a, 2013b), democratic norms them-
selves have actually become exhausted or at least highly ambivalent and are, in advanced
modern societies, perceived as a threat at least as much as they entail a promise.
Furthermore, this diagnosis suggests that this post-democratic turn has occurred in the
wake of a progressive, emancipatory process that has profoundly remoulded both core
principles of liberal democracy, i.e. the principle of liberty and self-determination and
that of equality and the egalitarian distribution of power, resources and social opportu-
nities. Hence, the post-democratic turn is, arguably, not easily reversible; the demand or
attempt to reinstate or revitalize earlier democratic norms is neither particularly promis-
ing, nor is it normatively unproblematic. Exactly this ambivalent relationship of con-
temporary citizens to democratic values is, we suggest, crucial for understanding the
contemporary proliferation of populism.
At one level, this ambivalence can be explained by factors such as: (1) the failure, or
at least entirely unexpected outcomes, of the new social movements’ participatory rev-
olution; (2) the increasing depoliticization and managerialism of contemporary policy-
making; or (3) the neoliberal appropriation of democracy and civil society as tools for a
profoundly anti-egalitarian agenda. Ultimately, the triggers and shaping parameters of
populist movements are, arguably, located at a more profound level. But not least with
regard to the suggestion that the failures of the emancipatory progressive left have made
a significant contribution to the proliferation of the populist right (e.g. Eribon, 2013;
4 European Journal of Social Theory XX(X)
Inglehart and Norris, 2016, 2017; Goodhart, 2017), exploring these three factors is a
helpful preliminary exercise:
First, the emancipatory social movements, which since the late 1960s had raised
extensive expectations for political participation and individual self-realization, not only
failed on their promise to give an equal political voice to all those whose rights and
concerns had previously been marginalized or oppressed, but they have actually even
exacerbated already existing social and political inequalities (Gilens, 2012): They prior-
itized the post-materialist identity needs of post-industrial middle-class cohorts, created
new modes and avenues of political participation, which were disproportionately used by
highly educated, politically articulate and well-networked social groups, and thus pro-
vided these sections of the citizenry with additional means of political influence. Further-
more, these movements were not successful in constructing any alternative to the
established societal order which they perceived as socially and ecologically destructive.
They systematically propelled the differentiation, individualization and internationaliza-
tion of modern societies, but were unable to specify any integrative principle to counter-
balance the centrifugal forces they had unleashed. Thus, the new social movements’
‘reinvention of politics’ and their ‘renaissance of political subjectivity’ (Beck, 1997:
100) benefited only some, while for many others the promise of self-determination and
self-responsibility turned into a daunting challenge. Unintentionally, the ‘renaissance of
political subjectivity’ actually gave rise to a new kind of risk society at least as threaten-
ing – although for other parts of society – as the one (Beck, 1992) which the new social
movements had set out to combat. In a dialectical turn, it soon nurtured new desires for a
renaissance of political objectivity that would, perhaps, facilitate the effective manage-
ment of ever more complex societal interests and needs.
Second, it is against this background that from the mid-1990s – in the name of
progressive politics – strategies of depoliticization were promoted, as a tool to increase
the efficiency, legitimacy and effectiveness of policy-making (e.g. Burnham, 2001;
Wood and Flinders, 2014). It was assumed that restricting the realm of political negotia-
tion and democratic decision-making would reduce the distorting influence of interest-
group politics, lessen the impact of paralysing power struggles and give more space to
the actual delivery of societal well-being and the common good. Demands to limit the
role of citizens had been articulated already in the 1970s, when the Trilateral Commis-
sion voiced concern that the increasing politicization of citizens and their rising expec-
tations for political influence and policy outcomes might lead to government overload
and a condition of ungovernability (Crozier et al., 1975; King, 1975). But two decades
later, depoliticization also meant to curtail the role of elected politicians, which was to be
restricted to those fields where expert planning would not sufficiently legitimize the
results (Mair, 2013). Given the complexity of issues to be addressed and the pace at
which policy-responses are required in modern societies, non-majoritarian institutions
were regarded as more competent and efficient than majority rule and elected represen-
tatives. The reduction of traditional-style democratic input-legitimacy was to be com-
pensated for by improved output-legitimacy (Scharpf, 1999). Yet, the promise that
strategies of depoliticization would once again bring power closer to the people (Flinders
and Buller, 2005) remained unfulfilled. Instead, increased reliance on supposedly more
knowledgeable expert bodies and their evidence-based policy-suggestions further
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removed politics from citizens and reinforced popular feelings of disempowerment.
Thus, practices of depoliticization, in fact, propelled the reassertion of popular sover-
eignty, yet public confidence in the democratic processes whose complexity-related
problems had triggered the agenda of depoliticization in the first place could not be
restored. Instead, the depoliticizing agenda of objectivation only reinforced the disillu-
sionment with the new social movements’ politicizing agenda of subjectivation. Exactly
this double disillusionment is the very crux of the post-democratic constellation, and the
neoliberal appropriation of democratic values and civil society further exacerbated the
problem.
Third, indeed, in western liberal societies, governments, public institutions and eco-
nomic actors, too, seem to have firmly embraced the values which the emancipatory
social movements had once forced onto the political agenda. Yet today’s rhetoric of
social justice, equal opportunities, democratic empowerment, citizen engagement, sus-
tainability, and so forth, contrasts starkly not only with the reality of ever increasing
social inequality (Gilens, 2012) and tightening sustainability crises, but also with neo-
liberal narratives about the primacy of market imperatives to which there is, allegedly,
no alternative (Dean, 2009). In fact, in the neoliberal era, the core values on which the
emancipatory movements had once based their normative challenge to the established
order, have been discovered as a resource, and refashioned into tools, for the stabiliza-
tion, resilience and legitimization of the status quo (Do¨rre et al., 2015). As the activating
state has adapted decentralization, self-responsibility and many other items from the
activist toolkit for its own use, the neoliberal agenda, democracy and democratization are
no longer a promise made to the socially underprivileged, nor is civil society still the
arena, subject and motor of any genuine alternative (Eribon, 2013). Indeed, democracy
and democratization have become ‘inadequate as a language and frame for left political
aspiration’ (Dean, 2009: 20). To struggle for democracy, Jodi Dean notes, is today to
struggle ‘for more of the same’ and ‘demand what is already present, accepted and
agreed on’ (2009: 24). Yet, a new political idiom that reaches beyond the neoliberal
status quo has not yet been found. And the coincidence of highly developed expectations
for autonomy and self-determination, on the one hand, and the decline or even unavail-
ability of the political means to even articulate – let alone realize – them, on the other, is
a core feature of the post-democratic constellation.
Thus, there are a number of quite specific factors which are important in explaining
the socio-political climate in which populist narratives and movements thrive.
Ultimately, however, the causes of the post-democratic turn – and the populist phenom-
enon – are located at a more profound level: they have, arguably, been triggered and are
being propelled by the ongoing process of modernization itself. Indeed, modernity and
democracy are connected to each other not only in that it was modernity – modernist
Enlightenment thinking – which had initially created the idea of the autonomous subject
that, ever since, has been the beacon and driving force of all emancipatory progressive
movements, but the ongoing process of modernization, at the same time, also under-
mines the foundations and resources of democracy – as Bobbio (1987), Zolo (1992),
Luhmann (1995) and many others powerfully argued well before all contemporary
debates about post-democracy and post-politics. Technological development, processes
of individualization, societal differentiation, cultural disembedding, the dynamics of
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globalization and so forth incrementally undermine the foundations of democracy and
give rise to risks and complexities which render democratic processes increasingly
dysfunctional: democracy becomes structurally inadequate for advanced modern soci-
eties (Macpherson, 1977; Greven, 2009). Ordinary citizens as well as elites, radical
activists as well as the bourgeois pillars of society, are, although for different reasons,
all ‘losing faith in democratic government and its suitability’ (Streeck, 2014a: 44) for the
tasks ahead (Rancie`re, 2007; Brennan, 2016; van Reybrouck, 2016).
The relationship between modernity and democracy may, therefore, be described in
terms of a parabola with the turning point, peak democracy, being located at the height of
the new social movements’ participatory revolution. Peak democracy is the point in the
ongoing modernization of contemporary societies beyond which the marginal utility of
more democracy and further democratization becomes smaller or indeed negative. The
image of the democratic parabola is very familiar, of course, from Crouch’s work on
post-democracy (Crouch, 2004). Yet, for Crouch, the primary reason for the decline of
democracy is neither the exhaustion of democratic ideals, nor the process of moderniza-
tion but, more than anything, the self-empowerment of neoliberal elites. And firmly in
line with the post-Marxist critical tradition, Crouch is fully preoccupied with the attempt
to somehow reverse the direction of the parabola and revive the project of democracy.
The argument here, in contrast, is that the advance of modernity itself renders such
efforts unpromising. The post-democratic turn renders the progressive project, as tradi-
tionally conceived, outdated. And it raises the question how the particular tensions which
are distinctive of the post-democratic constellation play out in practice, how the estab-
lished notions of democracy and progressiveness are being reframed, and how all this
may contribute to the understanding of right-wing populism.
Second-order emancipation and liquid identities
So peak democracy is, we are suggesting, the first constitutive element of the new
perspective from which we have to rethink populism. From this perspective it is imme-
diately evident why the traditional-style, moralizing condemnation of right-wing popu-
list movements as anti-democratic and illiberal (e.g. Mu¨ller, 2016) is – sociologically, at
least – unacceptably simplistic. Also, while observers are surely right in saying that such
movements are ‘the expression of a crisis of liberal-democratic politics’ (Mouffe, 2016;
see also Krastev, 2007), closer analysis of this ‘crisis’ has already revealed that it is
insufficient to simply conceptualize them as ‘rejecting post-politics and post-democ-
racy’, claiming back for ‘the people the voice that has been confiscated by the elites’, and
trying to reinstate ‘legitimate democratic aspirations’ (Mouffe, 2016). Furthermore, the
above discussion has signalled how, in the evolution of the post-democratic constella-
tion, the emancipatory progressive left has indeed played a significant role, but that the
suggestion that right-wing populism should – or indeed can – be countered through ‘the
construction of a progressive populist movement’ (Mouffe, 2016), or by left-wing parties
remembering their earlier political commitments, is not particularly plausible. Moving
on from here, a specifically subject-theoretical point of view can help to further develop
these points and elaborate the modernization-theoretical analysis, illuminating how the
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modernization of prevalent notions of subjectivity and identity has fundamentally recon-
figured the emancipatory – and the democratic – project.
The democratic project, Dahl (1998) tells us, is never complete but always remains an
open-ended struggle. Democratic norms and institutions have never been fixed; they
have always evolved and continuously been redefined in line with ongoing societal
development. This ongoing redefinition can usefully be conceptualized in terms of the
‘democratic dilemma’ that ‘system effectiveness and citizen effectiveness’ (Dahl, 1994:
34), i.e. ‘the ability of citizens to exercise democratic control over the decisions of the
polity’ and ‘the capacity of the system to respond satisfactorily to the collective prefer-
ences of its citizens’ (Dahl, 1994: 28), always remain in an unstable balance. Using the
term ‘democratic dilemma’ differently – but also drawing on Dahl, Kaltwasser (2014)
has suggested that the driver for this ongoing struggle is, first of all, that the notion of the
people claiming the right to political self-determination always remains contested and,
second, that there is an irresolvable tension in democratic systems between the principle
of constitutionalism, which aims to protect fundamental rights, and the principle of
popular sovereignty which accepts no such ex ante restrictions. Within this framework,
Kaltwasser then interprets populist movements as ‘responses’ to these ‘democratic
dilemmas’. He convincingly argues that – rather than being external or alien to democ-
racy – such movements need to be regarded as ‘something internal to democracy’ (2014:
484; also see Kaltwasser, 2012: 196–7), i.e. ‘populism is neither democratic nor anti-
democratic in itself’ (2014: 483), but essentially a manifestation of the open-ended
struggle. Yet, in line with Canovan (1999), Arditi (2004) and many others, he still
conceptualizes these ‘responses’ as being triggered by imbalances between conflicting
democratic principles for which populist movements may be a re-balancing ‘corrective’
(Kaltwasser, 2012; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013). Trying to avoid any such notion of a
fault – imbalance, asymmetry, disease, pathology – waiting to be corrected (Mudde,
2010; see also Mu¨ller, 2016; van Reybrouck, 2016), we suggest understanding right-
wing populism as signalling a transformation of democratic values, hopes and expecta-
tions – which in the post-democratic constellation have evolved well beyond the
emancipatory project in an earlier sense. We are thus returning to the ‘democratic
dilemma’ as defined by Dahl: the ongoing contestation of the effectiveness and
efficiency of democracy.
The yardstick by which citizens measure the effectiveness and efficiency of estab-
lished democratic norms and institutions is their understanding of their own personal
‘self’ and their collective identity (Butzlaff, 2016: 274–81). More specifically, the cri-
terion is the extent to which these norms and institutions reflect and represent their
prevalent values, interests and concerns. Theorists of modernization have highlighted
that over time the ways in which contemporary individuals perceive of themselves – and
accordingly their ideals of a good life, effective political representation and efficient
societal institutions – have profoundly changed: Already in the 1970s, Inglehart noted
that in post-industrial societies, issues of self-realization and the quality of life were
becoming ever more prominent (Inglehart, 1977). Processes of ‘modernisation and post-
modernisation’, he suggested (Inglehart, 1997), effect a shift of emphasis towards con-
cerns of identity and self-expression, with contemporary citizens becoming increasingly
elite-challenging, participation-oriented and politically self-confident. Giddens (1991a)
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and many others have noted that individual identity is ever less socially predetermined
and increasingly turns into a matter of individual choice and self-construction (Cortois
and Laermans, 2017). Sennett (1999) has pointed to the increasing complexity and
flexibility of individual norms and objectives, which he conceptualized as the ‘corrosion
of character’. Bauman (2000) has described how the goals of individual self-construction
are becoming ever more fuzzy and how this makes all forms of collective action increas-
ingly difficult. Still, Inglehart and many others have suggested that these ongoing pro-
cesses of modernization and post-modernization render contemporary societies,
including established democracies, ever more democratic. As late as 2005, Inglehart
still conceptualized this assumed trajectory as the ‘human development sequence’ or
even ‘syndrome’ (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005: 4). Yet, the proliferation of right-wing
populism sheds radical doubt on the idea of a steady progression towards an ever more
liberal, pluralistic, tolerant and democratic society. Indeed, these processes suggest that
the relationship between modernization-induced value change and the political culture of
advanced consumer societies needs to be thoroughly rethought.
For this purpose, the notion of second-order emancipation (Blu¨hdorn 2013a, 2013b)
is an instructive conceptual tool. Already Giddens (1991a, 1991b) and Beck (1992, 1997)
had started to think through – with their notion of reflexive modernization – the impli-
cations of modernity’s own norms and principles being themselves critically challenged.
Inglehart, too, had suggested that the value orientations to which the process of moder-
nization gives rise may not always be stable but that, under certain conditions, the
‘human development sequence’ may switch into ‘reverse direction’ and ‘bring retro-
gression toward authoritarian and xenophobic societies’ (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005: 4).
Yet, the notion of reflexive modernity implied, ultimately, little more than a renewed
attempt to bring, through a second modernity (Beck et al., 1994), the emancipatory
project to completion. And Inglehart clearly conceives of this ‘retrogression’ as a
short-term deviation from a developmental trajectory – the human development
sequence – to which modern societies will eventually return. Thus, in either case the
normative core of modernization and progressive politics remains essentially unchanged.
The notion of second-order emancipation, in contrast, suggests that the ongoing mod-
ernization of emancipatory values pushes the progressive project beyond its traditional –
liberal, democratic, inclusive, ecological, egalitarian – understanding and profoundly
redefines what is being conceptualized as progressive. To the analysis of right-wing
populism, this notion of second-order emancipation is, therefore, much more conducive.
It unhinges the very idea of a renewed emancipatory effort in a second modernity, and it
discards the notions of ‘retrogression’ (Inglehart and Norris, 2017) or a ‘great regression’
(Geiselberger, 2017).
Second-order emancipation implies that, in the wake of the ongoing processes of
modernization, the particular ideals of identity which once underpinned the Marxist and
post-Marxist critique of alienation, the vision of the liberation of the authentic, autono-
mous self, and thus the whole emancipatory democratic project as traditionally understood,
have become outdated (Blu¨hdorn, 2013a, 2013b, 2014). Kellner (1992), Gergen (1995)
and many others have pointed to the rise of the ‘fragmented subject’ (Reckwitz, 2010: 125;
see also Zˇizˇek, 2000) in advanced modern societies. They have convincingly argued that
contemporary individuals no longer pursue traditional notions of identity – centred,
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consistent, stable and rationally integrated, but maintain a fragmented and dynamic
patchwork of multiple identities that do not add up to a coherent and unified self.
And rather than being evidence of a pathological deviation, a ‘corrosion of character’
(Sennett, 1999) or the failure to realize an aspired ideal, this shift towards new notions of
the self, arguably, has to be interpreted as signalling the liberation from the boundaries
and constraints imposed by the idealist-bourgeois notion of identity. In a context of the
post-modern liberation from the grand narratives of modernity (Lyotard, 1997), it creates
new space for the non-rational or alternative rationalities, for inconsistence and incom-
patibility. It has emancipatory potentials in that it allows for the coexistence and pursuit
of contradictory values, behaviours and life perspectives to match the diverse opportu-
nities provided by an increasingly differentiated, complex and ever faster changing
social reality. In line with Bauman’s (2000) model of liquid modernity, this shift might
also be described as the rise of liquid identity – which, in a way, of course, also implies
the liquidation of identity. Yet, if the norms and institutions which at one point under-
pinned and supported the progressive democratic project have turned into constraints
on further emancipation and self-development; if they are no longer perceived as
efficient, effective and profitable for the realization of prevailing notions of the self,
their liquidation may well be perceived as emancipatory and progressive.
All this has significant implications for democracy: One the one hand, ever-rising
expectations for self-realization, self-determination and self-experience, paired with
declining confidence in existing political institutions, are leading to ever more vocifer-
ously articulated demands for more direct participation, better representation and, over-
all, more authentic political sovereignty. At the same time, however, the points
elaborated earlier, i.e. the participatory social movements’ failure to reverse the contin-
uous rise of political inequality, growing concerns about the unsuitability of democratic
processes to match conditions of high differentiation and complexity, and the neoliberal
instrumentalization of democracy and civil society all trigger profound democratic dis-
illusionment. Societal differentiation and the fragmentation of identities (individual and
collective) render social organization, consensual decision-making and collective action
ever more difficult. To the same degree that even at the level of the single individual,
values and interests are becoming ever more diverse, inconsistent and volatile, their
organization and consistent articulation – through political parties, movements or pro-
grammes – turns into a formidable challenge. Indeed, the transformation of traditional
notions of identity shatters established understandings of the key categories at the very
core of democracy – participation, representation, sovereignty, legitimacy – and implies
that for contemporary citizens these ideas may adopt a very different meaning: Liberal,
representative democracy is set to metamorphose into something categorically new
(Blu¨hdorn, 2007a, 2009, 2013a). And of this metamorphosis, the proliferation of
right-wing populism is, arguably, a central part.
The dilemma of late-modern identity politics
This subject-theoretical analysis further elaborates the intricate relationship between
modernization and democracy. The concepts of second-order emancipation and liquid
identity further explain why the much-debated crisis of democracy should rather be
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theorized as a profound and lasting, modernization-induced transformation of democ-
racy. These concepts are a constitutive element of the condition in which right-wing
populist movements thrive and are the second core pillar of the new perspective from
which, we are suggesting, such movements need to be investigated. In particular, these
concepts help to grasp that the post-democratic constellation, irritatingly, has to be
understood as an emancipatory achievement. Indeed, the transformation of prevalent
notions of subjectivity and identity plunges democracy, as traditionally understood, into
a profound legitimation crisis. As democracy has never been a value in itself, but derives
its value and legitimacy solely from the modernist norm of the autonomous subject, any
erosion and reconfiguration of this norm clearly affect the legitimacy of established
notions of democracy and its institutions. Thus, under the conditions of advanced mod-
ern societies (differentiation, complexity, acceleration, etc.), traditional-style represen-
tative democracy is not only increasingly dysfunctional and inefficient in terms of its
systemic performance (factual problem-solving capacity), but in terms of its emancipa-
tory performance as well.
Accordingly, any attempts to interpret populist movements from the perspective of
liberal representative democracy and conceptualize them as either a threat to democracy
or a potential corrective to perceived deformations are ill-conceived. The idea that they
respond to a ‘representation deficit’ – or indeed any democratic deficit at all – entirely
misses the central point: Such movements are not simply a backward-oriented response
to the perceived corruption and abuse of a still-cherished political form, but should be
seen, at least as much, as indicative of a new socio-cultural condition that is, as yet, in
search of a suitable political form. They articulate and address the needs of individuals
who, in line with their own emancipatory aspirations and the pressures of a changing
societal context, are moving beyond the constraints inherent in earlier norms of sub-
jectivity and the related forms of democracy. Hence the portrayal and critique of these
movements as backward and regressive is, at least sociologically, rather simplistic.
Similarly, their conceptualization as the revolt of the losers of modernization is inap-
propriate, first, because the ambivalence towards the established norms and institutio-
nalizations of democracy is, as Mair (2013), Rancie`re (2007) and many others have
rightly pointed out, spread widely throughout modern societies at large. And, second,
as evidenced by election analyses (e.g. Ivarsflaten, 2007; Berbuir et al., 2015; Lengfeld,
2017), populist movements are quite clearly not just addressing the needs of those who
have been left behind by modernization and have not embraced the newly emerging
value orientations. They appeal at least as much to those, who have gone along with the
modernization of social norms and values preferences, and are making every effort to
confront what emerges as the insidious dilemma of advanced modern societies: that
prevalent aspirations and expectations in terms of self-determination and self-
realization are more highly developed than ever before, while the conditions for actually
realizing them are increasingly unfavourable.
This dilemma affects different social groups in different ways and to a different
extent. Yet, its experience is common to significant parts of advanced modern societies,
perhaps even the majority of contemporary individuals. It entails, inter alia, that the
progressive liberation from traditional norms and predetermination demands modern
individuals pursue their objectives of self-realization and self-experience as a primarily
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personal project without ‘the psychological supports and sense of security provided by
more traditional settings’ (Giddens 1991a: 33); and they have to do so in a context where,
beyond this ever-increasing individualization, other constitutive features of moderniza-
tion – differentiation, acceleration, globalization, flexibilization, etc. – render the for-
mation and maintenance of a distinct and recognizable identity ever more difficult.
While in Beck’s risk society collective and coordinated action – either through the state
or through civil society institutions – still appeared as the most appropriate defence
against risks and as a source of security, the neoliberal opportunity society demands,
more than ever, individualized self-activation and self-responsibility (Sennett, 1999).
Accordingly, the attempt to cut loose from established commitments has become a core
feature of today’s struggle for competitive advantages.
Furthermore, as emancipatory movements keep chipping away at all traditional val-
ues and challenge any categorical principles that might underpin the formation of
identity as traditionally understood, consumption-based forms of self-realization and
self-articulation are becoming ever more prevalent. As Kellner (1992), Reckwitz
(2010), Bauman (2000) and many others have pointed out, for significant – and ever
larger – parts of contemporary societies, the consumer market has become the primary
arena of identity construction, and consumption-based lifestyles have become the pri-
mary mode of self-articulation (Kleine et al., 1993; Miles, 1996; Firat and Dholakia,
1998). Yet, advanced capitalist societies in Europe and elsewhere have entered a phase
where economic growth rates are consistently low – far too low to sustain established
arrangements for social justice and inclusion (e.g. Streeck, 2014b, 2016). And accord-
ingly, the neo-materialist and consumption-based forms of self-realization and self-
expression, idealized and resolutely claimed by virtually all parts of society, can be
realized and sustained only by some – and at the expense of others. Put differently, the
defence and maintenance of what is commonly referred to as our freedom, our values
and our lifestyles necessitate, more visibly than ever, external as well as internal bound-
aries and lines of exclusion. Egalitarian and redistributive forms of politics (and notions
of democracy) are therefore, unsurprisingly, turning into a serious problem – not just for
some social groups, but for anybody concerned about the defence of their emancipatory
achievements and the further realization of their aspirations. The new big project – for
society at large! – is to organize the legitimation and execution of a politics of increasing
inequality and exclusion.
Exactly this fusion of peak democracy, second-order emancipation and the shortage
of the resources (cultural as well as material), on which progressive identity formation
and self-realization crucially depend, releases, we are suggesting, the political energy
that powers right-wing populist movements. And counter to suggestions that these
movements are subversive of the established order, they do not in any way challenge
the prevalent principles and logic of modernization. Neither in material economic terms,
nor in terms of identity politics do they offer any alternative to the status quo, but they
emerge as key players in the new politics of exclusion. Their economic policies do not in
any sense endeavour to reinstate egalitarian or redistributive commitments, but tend to
continue neoliberal agendas of austerity and modernization (e.g. Swank and Betz, 2003;
Kitschelt, 2007). They entail no attempt to redress the persistent rise of social inequality,
but merely extend the logic of exclusion to the bottom of society and refocus political
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energies on migrants and supposedly undeserving minority groups (Bale, 2012). Essen-
tially, they democratize the politics of exclusion, provide it with bottom-up legitimacy
and activate the underprivileged themselves as agents to further entrench its logic. In
terms of culture and identity, right-wing populist movements are far from surrendering
the emancipatory achievements of past decades. There is little to suggest that they reject
the ideals of the flexible subject or no longer aspire to the liquid lifestyles and
consumption-based forms of self-realization. In a context where the resources for non-
materialist and solid forms of identity are becoming increasingly scarce, they are,
instead, activating those parts of society for the defence of these exclusive patterns of
self-realization, who are concerned about not being able to sustain their own participa-
tion in them.
For these reasons, any interpretation of right-wing populist movements in terms of a
political backlash either against economic inequality or the loss of cultural identity
seems profoundly inadequate, indeed, dangerously misleading. Inglehart and Norris
have suggested that these contemporary movements ought to be read as ‘an angry and
resentful counter-revolution’ to ‘the silent revolution of the 1970s’ (Inglehart and Norris,
2016: 5) and a ‘retro reaction by once-predominant sectors of the population to progres-
sive value change’ (Inglehart and Norris, 2016: 1). More curiously, still, they are pre-
dicting that, having been triggered by a generational cleavage, contemporary European
and North American right-wing populism is set to ‘fade over time, as older cohorts with
traditional attitudes are gradually replaced in the population by their children and grand-
children, adhering to more progressive values’ (Inglehart and Norris, 2016: 5). Undoubt-
edly, right-wing movements are addressing themselves, inter alia, to social groups who
cannot capitalize on the erosion of traditional social ties and securities, and who expe-
rience their social and economic environs as a risk society rather than an opportunity
society. Romanticizing an allegedly better past, they may well militate against liquid
lifestyles and consumerist identities and glorify, instead, the supposedly superior values
of tradition, common sense, simplicity and nativeness. Yet, despite this rhetoric, there is
no evidence of right-wing movements genuinely challenging the achievements and logic
of modernization. Accordingly, the hypothesis of a ‘new cultural cleavage’ with populist
values ‘representing one pole of a cultural continuum’ and ‘cosmopolitan liberal values’
being located ‘at the opposite pole’ (Inglehart and Norris, 2016: 7–8) seems fundamen-
tally misconceived. And the suggestion that right-wing populism will in due course fade
away dangerously obstructs a clear view of the ongoing – and very significant – trans-
formation of liberal democracy.
Third modernity and practices of simulation
Thus, it has become clear why a radical shift of perspective beyond the democratic and
emancipatory norms which still govern most of the literature on right-wing populism is
overdue. For an adequate understanding of the populist phenomenon a thorough grasp of
what has been conceptualized here as peak democracy, the post-democratic constella-
tion, second-order emancipation and contemporary ideals – as well as the politics – of
self-realization is a prerequisite. The approach via democratic theory has demonstrated
that it is simplistic to portray right-wing populism as the enemy of, or a threat to,
Blu¨hdorn and Butzlaff 13
democracy; nor should it be interpreted as the reassertion of any democratic fundamen-
tals or a corrective for any contemporary pathology of liberal, representative democra-
cies. Instead, it should be seen as indicative of the incremental exhaustion of the old
democratic project and the search for a new political form that best matches the values,
preferences and needs of contemporary societies and individuals. Accordingly, any
moralizing critique of the progressive left which, supposedly, has let down its clientele
is just as misguided as the critique of right-wing populism which is said to endanger
emancipatory democratic values. In the ongoing process of modernization, this progres-
sive left has dissolved – witness the wealth of literature asking for its whereabouts – and
so have the working class which it once represented and the emancipatory democratic
ideals for which it once stood. Other notions of progressiveness and emancipation have
taken over.
The approach via modernization theory, in turn, has revealed that right-wing popu-
lism is not satisfactorily interpreted as anti-modernist or a phenomenon of a regressive
modernity, but is, at least as much, indicative of second-order emancipation and the
progressive evolution of modernity. Our focus on changing notions of subjectivity and
contemporary needs and patterns of self-realization has placed the emphasis on the
demand side. This does not mean to deny the significance and justification of supply
side approaches, which focus, for example, on political entrepreneurs, the resources and
opportunity structures they mobilize, or the question whether right-wing populism qua-
lifies as a political ideology. But the objective here has been to reveal that the recent tide
of populism is much more than the work of menacing demagogues and ideologues: it is a
constitutive – and probably lasting – feature of a new era that distinguishes itself through
categorically different understandings of modernity, emancipation and progressiveness
beyond the old political conflict lines. This new era takes contemporary societies beyond
Ulrich Beck’s first and second modernities (1992, 1997). For both of these – and the
entirety of social science in the critical tradition – the Cartesian, Christian and Kantian
notion of the autonomous subject was the central norm of reference. The distinctive
feature of the new third modernity (Blu¨hdorn, 2013a), in contrast, is that, in the wake of
second-order emancipation, this very norm has itself been left behind – or at least
comprehensively reconfigured. Exactly this, we have aimed to demonstrate, is the new
perspective from which the populist phenomenon ought to be explored, i.e. not from the
traditional position – and with the normative tools – of first and second modernity, but
from the new perspective of third modernity which recognizes right-wing populism as
catering to specific needs that are distinctive of this new form of modernity.
These needs, we have argued, include, first of all, the practical organization and
legitimation of the politics of exclusion, which for contemporary aspirations and expec-
tations of self-realization is conditio sine qua non. Thus, right-wing populist movements
organize societal inclusion into the politics of exclusion; they secure the democratization
of exclusion and thus help to maintain – for those included – our freedom, our values and
our lifestyles. But they are also addressing social needs in a very important second
respect: In a scenario where, across all parts of modern societies, the desire and demand
for freedom, self-determination and sovereignty have increased to an unprecedented
level, while, at the same time, second-order emancipation keeps chipping away at the
very foundations of the identical subject and the political order that was meant to
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guarantee and realize its autonomy and sovereignty, populist movements offer an escape
route, or a coping strategy, for the dilemma that the demand for autonomy and sover-
eignty, on the one hand, and the pursuit of second-order emancipation, on the other, are
mutually incompatible: They organize the performative regeneration of what second-
order emancipation strives to leave behind and thus facilitate the experience of subjec-
tivity, collective identity and political sovereignty.
Quite rightly, Mu¨ller (2016) and many others have pointed out that right-wing popu-
lists, more than anything, celebrate the unified people (e.g. Mudde, 2010; Kriesi, 2014;
Spruyt et al., 2016). Eribon (2013) and others have suggested that by voting for populist
parties, the modern precariat aims to defend their collective identity. And as Krastev
states, ‘the more governments are constrained (by the IMF, the EU, or investors and the
bond market) from changing economic policies, the more political competition comes to
revolve around identity issues’ (2014: 12). First, however, identity politics is, contrary to
what Krastev seems to imply, not a substitute for material politics, but the latter is, as we
discussed, more than ever an integral part of the former. Second, any focus on the
precariat distracts from the important point that under conditions of contemporary mod-
ernity, the construction and maintenance of identity are a major challenge not just for
some, but for all social groups. And, third, the moralizing critique that with their cele-
bration of the people, of collective identity and popular sovereignty, populist movements
make promises which they can never fulfil (Mu¨ller, 2016: 28), entirely fails to recognize
that in the era of third modernity fulfilling these promises is not the point and would
actually be counter-productive – even regressive. Instead, this celebration is, arguably,
about managing the contradiction that is distinctive of third modernity: that contempo-
rary individuals and societies, with their project of second-order emancipation, consis-
tently pursue the liberation from all established identities, norms and commitments, but
at the same time also have ever higher expectations in terms of self-realization, self-
expression and political self-determination. For an appropriate understanding of the
populist phenomenon, this point is crucial: Beyond the political function specified
above, the particular service and appeal of populist movements are, we are suggesting,
that they perform, and facilitate the experience of something that, in third modernity, is
no longer possible, and beyond second-order emancipation and the post-democratic turn
also not really desirable – but, nevertheless, more than ever, vociferously in demand. In
this self-contradictory constellation, the objective is not the actual realization of indi-
vidual and collective identity, autonomy and sovereignty as understood in the Enlight-
enment tradition, but their performance and experience.
Exactly this is, arguably, what populist movements deliver, why they have so strong
an appeal well beyond the so-called losers of modernization, why they keep proliferat-
ing, although they have no articulate vision and plausible political offer, and why the
search for political counter-strategies has so far remained futile. Populist movements
can, therefore, very productively be interpreted within the model of simulative politics
(Blu¨hdorn, 2007b, 2007c, 2013a), i.e. as set of societal practices which pursue the
discursive regeneration, and facilitate the experience of, norms, values and political
constellations, which, in the wake of modernization and second-order emancipation,
have become unwanted and outdated – and yet, also more desirable than ever (Blu¨hdorn,
2007a, 2013b, 2014). Borrowing the words of Ulrich Beck, what right-wing populist
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movements offer is ‘not the renaissance of the people, but the renaissance of the staging
of the people (or the staging of the renaissance of the people)’ (Beck, 1997: 150). In a
similar vein, but with stronger moral overtones, others have talked of the ‘theatre of
sovereignty’ (Appadurai, 2017: 2–3), which does not aim for ‘conquering power in order
to exercise it’ (Rosanvallon, 2008: 258), but criticizes political elites while ‘tacitly
renouncing joint responsibility for creating a shared world’ (Rosanvallon, 2008: 253).
The moralizing overtones are, at least from a sociological perspective, inappropriate and
unhelpful, but as we have tried to demonstrate throughout this article, populist move-
ments are indeed not about unhinging the anti-egalitarian and exclusive logic of the
established order, but about sustaining and further entrenching it. Their practices of
simulation may, in a sense, be compared to Laclau’s (2005) empty signifiers, and they
may be said to populate Lefort’s (1988) empty space of democracy. But Laclau, too,
understands populism as aiming for a political transformation that materially addresses
the social grievances and resolves the ‘crisis in the old structure’ (2005: 177) from which
it emerges. Simulative politics, in contrast, is about the simultaneity of incompatibles. It
allows for an experience of sovereignty that does not compromise the agenda of second-
order emancipation.
Thus, ultimately, right-wing populism articulates the conflict between second and
third modernity. This conflict is not well understood as a conflict between different
social groups – losers vs. winners of modernization; retrogressives vs. cosmopolitans
(Inglehart and Norris, 2016); somewheres vs. anywheres (Goodhart, 2017) – but much
more adequately as a battle playing out – although to differing degrees – within con-
temporary individuals: a conflict between different sets of norms which are mutually
incompatible. It is, arguably, for this reason that the populist rhetoric resonates – again to
differing degrees, of course – in very diverse parts of contemporary societies and that it is
so difficult to develop effective political responses. Accordingly, the populist phenom-
enon is also much better described in terms of a discourse than a political movement.
Political movements – although lesser so than political parties – are commonly assumed
to have members whose political ideals, values and identities they articulate and repre-
sent. Political discourses, in contrast, can, drawing on Luhmann’s theory of social
systems (Luhmann, 1995), be understood as communicative arenas or systems of mean-
ing, which are integrated by particular communicative codes, but never include full
individuals. In this Luhmannite sense, populist movements may have a core membership
whose thinking and communication do not go much beyond the boundaries of the popu-
list communicative code, but, beyond these, populist discourse also caters for a wide
range of other individuals who partially, occasionally or selectively sympathize with
populist ideas, while at the same time, and in different discursive contexts, also maintain
entirely different values and agendas. Populist discourses thus have the quality of a
communicative theme park (Blu¨hdorn, 2006, 2007b) used – with differing intensity –
by diverse parts of advanced modern societies. And in that they allow, in the era of third
modernity, for the articulation and experience of norms of autonomy and sovereignty,
they have a significant social and political function.
For the mainstream of the existing literature that remains committed to the established
norms of democracy and emancipation, this new perspective on populism may well be
difficult to accept. But we believe that the model developed here provides an extremely
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promising framework for rethinking populism and for new empirical studies which may
build, for example, on Bull’s work on the Italian Lega Nord (Bull, 2010). Reaching
beyond this article’s narrow focus on Euro-American right-wing populism, the model is,
with some adaptation, probably also applicable to other varieties of populism and geo-
graphical areas. The established mainstream narratives on populism, on the other hand,
and the refusal to engage with the realities conceptualized here as peak democracy,
liquid identity and third modernity, arguably, only contribute to the maintenance of
societal self-descriptions which are just as delusionary and self-deceptive as the right-
wing rhetoric which they condemn.
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